Banks are usually better informed on the loans they originate than outside investors. As a result, securitized loans might be of lower credit quality than -otherwise similar -non-securitized loans. We assess the effect of securitization activity on credit quality employing a uniquely detailed dataset from the euro-denominated syndicated loan market. We find that, at issuance, banks do not select and securitize loans of lower credit quality. Following securitization, however, the credit quality of borrowers whose loans are securitized deteriorates by more than those in the control group. We find tentative evidence suggesting that poorer performance by securitized loans might be linked to banks' reduced monitoring incentives.
Introduction
Banks generate proprietary information and tend to have superior knowledge on the credit quality of the loans they originate. As a result, banks might have an incentive to securitize loans of lower credit quality to unsuspecting investors (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995) . Largely for this reason, securitization has been perceived as a major contributing factor to the 2007-2009 financial crisis (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011) . Following the crisis, a number of banks have been investigated by authorities over claims related to mis-sold securitized loans. 1
In this direction, most of the empirical evidence suggests that banks tend to securitize the riskier mortgages of their portfolio (see for instance Krainer and Laderman, 2014; Elul, 2015) .
Simultaneously, some of the recent results -for the corporate bond market and for the mortgage market outside the United States (U.S.) -question whether securitized were necessarily riskier than non-securitized loans (see for instance, Benmelech et al., 2012; Albertazzi et al., 2015) .
Mainly due to data limitations however, most of the existing evidence is limited to the U.S. and focuses on the mortgage markets.
We assess the credit quality of securitized loans on the euro-denominated corporate loan market. In practical terms, we contrast the credit performance of securitized versus non-securitized loans over time. We first link the probability of loan securitization to a set of loan and borrower characteristics. We then track changes in loans' credit quality as measured by borrowers' expected default frequencies. In the robustness checks we also employ alternative methodologies, including 1 For instance, in the U.S., JP Morgan and Bank of America agreed to pay USD 4.5 and 9.1 billion, respectively, to settle court cases with institutional investors regarding mis-sold mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The U.S. Federal Housing Finance Agency reached settlements of around USD 16.5 billion with eighteen major financial institutions alleged to be involved in securities law violations and fraud in the sale of MBS to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. On a separate case, Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase agreed to pay around USD 15 billion to the U.S. Department of Justice over allegations related to misled investors on MBS during the time leading up to the 2007-2009 crises. propensity score matching, to compare the credit risk of securitized and non-securitized corporate loans which were, prior to securitization, very similar in terms of their observable characteristics.
We resort to a unique dataset obtained directly from securitization trustees operating in the European Union (EU). We construct this dataset by getting access to the portfolios of the majority of euro-denominated collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) so we are able to form a representative picture of the market, which includes public as well as private deals. Our detailed loan level dataset allows us to distinguish among all syndicated loans, those that were eventually securitized.
We focus on the euro-denominated CLO market which, we believe, is a good laboratory to assess the impact of securitization on credit quality. One reason is that in Europe the advent of securitization has been largely due to private market forces. The institutional setting for securitization markets in Europe stands in stark opposition to the U.S., where government sponsored enterprises (GSE) have influenced the incentives and dynamics of securitization markets. As a result, in the U.S. it might be difficult more disentangle the effects of securitization on credit markets due to the concurrent impact of GSEs. In addition, in Europe the securitization markets started very timidly in the late 1990s, and developed significantly only from 2004 to 2007. In contrast, in the U.S. the introduction and growth of securitization markets have been much more continuous over time. The sudden appearance of securitization in Europe probably allows for a clearer assessment of its effects than in other regions. Finally, securitization activity in the Europe coexists with a very large covered bond market which provide banks with a source of long-term market funding alternative to securitization. Hence the differentiated effect of securitization, as opposed to other types of bank funding, can be more easily analyzed in Europe.
Concentrating on corporate loan securitization also provides a useful perspective as most of the existing literature analyzes the mortgage market. Mortgage lending, tends to be relatively mechanical and the credit risk of mortgage backed securities (MBS) is heavily reliant on housing prices. In contrast, corporate lending decisions are more dependent on idiosyncratic, and often proprietary, information on the credit quality of borrowers which is often obtained over time via lending relationships. In other words, information asymmetries are likely to be particularly pronounced in the securitization of corporate loans as the idiosyncratic risk of individual borrowers -which is often difficult to ascertain for outside investors -plays a large role. As a result, the screening and monitoring by the lender of individual borrowers would be expected to have a bigger impact on the performance of corporate loans after securitization than for other types of loans.
We find that, based on borrowers' publicly available information at issuance, originating banks do not seem to select and securitize lower quality corporate loans to outsiders. We also show that following securitization, the credit quality of borrowers whose loans are securitized deteriorates by more than those in the control group. While this underperformance could be due to a number of causes, we provide some tentative evidence suggesting that the poorer performance of securitized loans might be linked to banks' reduced incentives to monitor those loans.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews and draws hypotheses from the related literature. Section 3 describes the data sources and explains the empirical methodology used in the analysis. Results are presented and discussed in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
Literature and Hypotheses
Recent results for the U.S. suggest that banks that resorted more intensively to securitization activity in the years prior to the crisis relaxed their lending standards more aggressively than other institutions (Keys et al., 2011; Dell'Ariccia, 2012; Nadauld and Weisbach, 2012) . There is also evidence linking securitization activity and increases in bank risk-taking (Goderis et al., 2007; Instefjord, 2005; Haensel and Krahnen, 2007) , and augmented systemic risk (Michalak and Uhde, 2013; Krahnen and Wilde, 2008; Brunnermeier and Sannikov 2014; Wagner, 2007). 2 In contrast, other studies do not find evidence suggesting that securitization led to riskier lending activities (Shivdasani and Wang, 2011 for leveraged buyouts; Casu et al., 2013 for overall bank risk; Albertazzi et al., 2015 for the Italian market). There is also an alternative literature that underlines its potential benefits and suggests that securitization helps to support financial stability by smoothing out risks among many investors (Duffie, 2008) , improving banks' ability to manage credit risk (Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004) and increasing banks' profitability (Jiangli et al., 2007) .
More closely related to our paper, some of the empirical work examines the performance of loans after they have been securitized. Evidence in this direction is however limited and its results are, at times, inconclusive. Some of these studies suggest that in the U.S. the credit quality of securitized corporate loans is not worse than that of non-securitized loans (Benmelech et al., 2012) . 3 Alternatively there is also evidence that finds inferior credit performance for securitized loans after securitization (Bord and Santos, 2015) . For the mortgage market, recent results suggest that in the U.S. banks securitized ex-ante their riskiest mortgages and that following securitization the delinquency rates for securitized were higher than for non-securitized mortgages (Krainer and Laderman, 2014; Elul, 2015) . On the other hand, looking at an earlier period, Ambrose et al., (2005) show that in the U.S. securitized mortgages experienced lower ex-post defaults than those retained by banks' in their balance sheets.
2 There is also evidence showing that securitization inhibits distressed borrowers' loan renegotiations (Piskorski et al., 2010) . 3 Authors report some evidence of under-performance for securitized loans originated between 2005 and 2007 although they suggest that this finding is not consistent across samples, performance measures, and horizons.
We analyze whether banks securitized their lower quality euro-denominated corporate loans in the build up to the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Information asymmetries on the credit quality of borrowers between originating banks and purchasers of CLOs provide banks with the initial opportunity to do so as originators are likely to have better information about the borrowers' credit quality than the buyers of the CLOs. This is either because originators might have extensive experience in lending to that sector, or because they have a lending relationship with the borrower that allows them to collect proprietary information on the borrower over time. From an investor's perspective, a related argument is that even sophisticated investors might have neglected tail risks (Gennaioli et al., 2012) .
The credit cycle is also likely to play a significant role on banks' ability to securitize lower quality loans: During good states of a credit cycle (i.e., upswing of the credit cycle), investors might be more willing to acquire riskier securities. It could also be that during credit expansions it is more difficult for investors to assess the true value of information intensive securities -such as CLOs -. 4 Building on the extensive literature on adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970) , this idea suggests that credit booms intensify the incentives to invest in securities that are more difficult to evaluate (Dang et al., 2012; Santos, 2015) and that credit risk embedded in securitized loans changes significantly across the business cycle (Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011) .
In stark contrast, other studies suggest that banks might also have an incentive to securitize only those loans that are of intrinsic better credit risk in order to signal the quality of the securities (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987; DeMarzo, 2005; Instefjord, 2005) . Banks may also have an incentive to securitize less risky loans thereby increasing their risk profile for a given level of capital (Calem and LaCour-Little, 2004) . Maintaining their long-term reputational capital in the securitization market might induce banks to sell their loans of relatively better quality (Albertazzi et al., 2015) . The signaling hypothesis would therefore suggests that based on observables at the time of issuance, originating banks would be securitizing those loans with lower credit risk. Hence our first hypothesis would suggest that:
H1. Signaling hypothesis: At issuance, securitized corporate loans were of better credit quality than -otherwise similar -non-securitized loans.
After securitization, originating banks might have less incentives to monitor borrowers because loans are passed on to outside investors. As a result, over time securitized would perform worse than non-securitized loans as the originating bank might monitor securitized loans less intensively (Petersen and Rajan, 2002) . Supporting this view, some studies associated loan sales and securitization to looser credit monitoring (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Duffee and Zhou, 2001; Morrison, 2005; Parlour and Plantin, 2008; Chiesa, 2008; Wang and Xia, 2014; Kamstra et al., 2014) . Hence, our second hypothesis: H2. Monitoring hypothesis: Over time securitized corporate loans perform worse than nonsecuritized loans due to banks' reduced monitoring incentives.
Another possible explanation for the relative worse credit performance of securitized loans after securitization, may be that banks are able to exploit their information advantage. Banks may have to securitize apparently better loans, based on publicly observable characteristics, in order to signal quality while still exploiting their information advantage over outsiders. In fact, the signaling argument relies on the fact that outsiders could only and roughly assess the credit quality through observable indicators such as credit ratings. At the same time given their access to proprietary information, compared potential buyers of the securitized loan, banks may possess a more accurate view on the future performance of the loans they originated. Hence, banks would have an incentive to securitize those apparently good loans that they expect to perform worse compared to the expected path of performance that could be inferred by outsiders from the observable characteristics of borrowers at the time of securitization. For example, there is evidence from trading in the secondary market of mortgage-backed securities suggesting that, banks exploit their access to inside information (Drucker and Mayer, 2008) and that prior to securitization, mortgage lenders adversely selected higher prepayment risk mortgages (Agarwal et al., 2012) . We derive the third hypothesis from this discussion:
H3. Lemons hypothesis: Over time securitized corporate loans perform worse than non-securitized loans due to banks' ability of exploiting their information advantage over outside investors.
To disentangle between the monitoring and lemons hypotheses, we track and compare the ex-post credit risk of loans that are securitized versus those which are non-securitized. We then examine the loans where bank monitoring may have a more significant bearing on borrowers' performance. We conjecture that collateralized loans, where assets are pledged to the bank by the borrower, do not require as much monitoring as uncollateralized loans (Bester, 1985; Cerqueiro et al., 2015) . This is because the borrower, having her assets at stake, would be less likely to engage in risk-shifting behavior at the expense of the lender and therefore show a better performance. If the lemons hypothesis is true, we would expect that, after securitization, the performance of loans that are securitized would be worse compare to those similar loans that are not securitized. If the monitoring hypothesis holds, we would expect that following securitization uncollateralized loans to perform more poorly than similar collateralized loans.
Data and Methodology

Data
Data on syndicated loans is obtained from Dealogic-Loanware. It includes all euro-denominated syndicated loans granted by euro-area banks between 2004 and 2009 to non-financial corporations headquartered in the euro area. Data on securitization activity comes from Dealogic-Bondware and Standard & Poor's. 5 We limit our sample to funded and cash-flow (balance-sheet) CLOs issued by banks headquartered in the euro area. 6 We add two additional fields to our dataset which allow us to identify among all syndicated loans, those that were eventually securitized. We do this by collecting loan-by-loan confidential information from all the major EU Trustees for loans issued between 2004 and 2009. Overall, 1,795 out of 4,652 syndicated loans extended during this period are subsequently securitized. 7
We carefully match our database on syndicated loans with information on the expected probability of default (EDF) of each borrower underlying each syndicated loan from 2005 to 2010.
The EDF, computed by Moody's KMV, is a forward-looking firm-specific measure of the actual probability of default calculated using a structural approach which builds on Merton's model to price corporate bond debt (Merton, 1974) . The final EDF value, expressed as a percentage, represents the implied risk of default and is constructed by combining companies' financial statements with stock market information and a proprietary default database maintained by Moody's KMV. EDF developments are regularly used as an indicator by financial institutions, investors, central banks and regulators to monitor credit risks of borrowers assuming that EDFs track closely physical expectations of default. By matching our syndicated loan database to those borrowers for which an EDF measure is available reduces our sample only to those borrowers that are listed on the stock market.
Model and Variables
We first estimate a logistic model that links the probability of loan securitization to certain loan and borrower characteristics:
Where Pr is the probability of securitization for loan i in the year following its issuance, Φ is the standard cumulative normal probability distribution, L is a set of variables controlling for loan characteristics, and Z is another set of variables controlling for other factors expected to impact on the probability of securitization. Loan characteristics include: loan spread (basis points), loan size (natural logarithm), maturity (years), presence of guarantees, collateral, instrument type, loan purpose (corporate use, capital structure, project finance, transport finance, corporate control and property finance). We also control for industry (construction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, population related services, state, manufacturing and transport), syndicate size and date of issuance.
We track the change in EDF (∆EDF) to proxy for developments in borrowers' credit quality. Using this variable we examine the ex-post (i.e., after the loan has been issued) credit performance of the loan controlling for observable characteristics at the time of loan origination.
We use three alternative measures to calculate ∆EDF as follows: , 2008, 2009 and 2010) . For example, to calculate the ∆EDFC for 2008, we take the difference between the average EDF in 2008 and that of the third quarter of 2007. The idea is that many of the inherent risks in a securitization structure could be of systemic nature and materialize only in the event of a (large) financial crisis.
Propensity Score Matching
The analysis of the effect of securitization on loan's credit quality might raise self-selection concerns with regard to the decision to securitize certain loans. If credit performance of securitized and non-securitized loans would have differed systematically in the absence of securitization, comparing credit risk of securitized and non-securitized loans might yield biased estimates on the impact of securitization. Under this assumption, if securitized loans are found to perform differently, on average, than non-securitized, the difference may be due to the effect of selfselection rather than to securitization. Strictly speaking in order to test our hypothesis, we need to know what would have happened to the credit quality of securitized loans had they had not been securitized. Because it is impossible to observe the same loan in both states, we need to find an appropriate proxy for the counterfactual credit performance of securitized loans. Good candidates for the counterfactual are non-securitized loans from which we construct our control group. We construct this control group using a propensity score matching (PSM) approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) . PSM allows us reduce the matching problem to a single dimension via the propensity score.
We match our loan sample using propensity scores to compare securitized and nonsecuritized loans which are ex-ante (i.e., prior to securitization) similar in terms of some of their key observable characteristics. Importantly, our control group -constructed from the nonsecuritized loans -is selected among those loans whose credit risk prior to securitization lies as close as possible to that of similar securitized loans. If we assume that there are no significant differences in unobservables between the two matched groups of loans -or that unobservables do not play a significant role on the potential outcome-the observed differential in credit risk (∆EDF) can be attributed to the effect of having received the treatment, which in our setting is the securitization of the loan.
Through matching we restrict our inference to the sample of securitized and matched nonsecuritized loans. The impact of the treatment (securitization) on loan i, δi, is the difference between potential outcomes (∆EDF) with and without treatment:
The impact of securitization over the sample would be the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), computed as follows:
As indicated, the treated group (securitized loans, denoted Ti = 1 for loan i) is matched with a control group (non-securitized loans, denoted Ti = 0 for loan i) on the basis of its propensity score which is a function of loan and borrower observable characteristics:
In our setting the propensity score, , is initially estimated with a probit model where the binary dependent variable has a value of one for securitized loans, and zero otherwise. The regressors, include credit quality prior to securitization, loan characteristics -loan purpose, business industry and size -as well as bank, year and country dummies.
There needs to be sufficient overlap in the propensity scores to match securitized and nonsecuritized loans. We impose a common support condition [ 0 1 ] that restricts inference to treated and non-treated units with comparable propensity scores. That is, non-treated units whose propensity scores are lower (or higher) than the defined minimum (maximum) are dropped. We employ nearest-neighbor matching where each securitized loan is matched with those non-securitized loans with the closest propensity scores (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) :
where by is the set of control loans with an estimated value of the propensity score , matched to securitized loan i. We calculate our control group using matching with and without replacement. 8 This allows us to increase the quality of the matching and decrease bias (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) . Our main results are constructed using one to one (1:1) matching where each securitized loan is matched with a single non-securitized loan. We also calculate results for two
(1:2) and four (1:4) matches. Increasing the number of matches might also increase bias -as the second and fourth closest matches are usually further away from the treated loan than the first match. At the same time the use of multiple matches can decrease variance as the matched sample becomes larger (Rubin and Thomas, 2000) .
Results
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 . In Panel A we display the mean, median, standard deviation and mean comparison (t-tests) of loan and borrower characteristics. We find that securitized loans tend to be smaller in size and have a longer maturity than non-securitized loans.
The number of banks in the loan syndicate and the ratio of banks active in securitization (to total banks) in the syndicate are almost identical for both groups. EDFs of companies whose loans are non-securitized are usually higher than for companies whose loans are securitized. In Panel B we display the summary statistics for the dummy variables. We find that a large share of securitized loans are secured using collateral and tend to be leveraged.
Whole Sample
In Table 2 we present the results for the logistic model including the levels (EDF) and changes (∆EDFA) in credit risk. We start by employing only the level of credit risk (i.e., EDF) at the time of the issuance (column I). Controlling for a set of micro and macro variables, 9 we find that loans of borrowers with relatively higher default risk are less likely to be securitized -EDF coefficient is negatively affected by the probability of loan securitization. This suggests that. The finding supports the signaling hypothesis that suggests that banks signal quality by retaining assets of poorer credit risk, as observed at issuance, and tend to securitize assets of initially better credit quality (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987; DeMarzo, 2005; Instefjord, 2005) .
Subsequently, we relate the ex-post performance of borrowers (∆EDFA) to the likelihood of loan securitization. Columns II to IV show the ∆EDFA for sets of one to three year time periods.
They all show a positive relationship between the ex-post ∆EDFA and the probability of loan securitization for all time horizons. This suggests that the likelihood of loan securitization is higher for borrowers that showed worse performance after securitization.
We present the ∆EDFB results in Table 3 . Here we measure the differences in EDF between the year in which the loan issued and three time periods (i.e., 2008, 2009 or 2010) chosen to take place during the financial crisis. We find that the coefficient of the ∆EDFB is significant for all time horizons suggesting that borrowers whose loans are securitized showed inferior performance than loans that were not.
We are also interested in changes in borrowers' relative performance during the financial crisis (∆EDFC). ∆EDFC is calculated as the changes in EDF from the start of the financial crisis to three separate periods that take place during the financial crisis. Results -presented in Table 4 -show that ∆EDFC has a positive and significant coefficient for the 2009 and 2010 periods and is not significant for 2008. This suggests that loans of borrowers whose default risk would materialize in the event of a systemic crisis were more likely to be securitized.
Propensity scores
As an alternative strategy to assess the robustness of our results we use a propensity score matching. This technique allows us measure the impact of securitization on credit risk using a comparable sample of loans.
To verify the quality of matching graphically we first plot the distribution of the propensity score for both groups (securitized or non-securitized loans), before and after matching, for the whole sample (Figure 1 ). In the unmatched sample, the propensity score distribution of the nonsecuritized loans is skewed to the left. In contrast in the matched sample the distribution of the two groups is similar. This suggests that the use of propensity score matching is appropriate in our context. Table 5 presents the ∆EDFA results. We find that for loans of the securitized (treatment) group, the treatment has increased their future EDF for all time horizons and that the highest impact is seen in year three. It shows that the credit quality of borrowers whose loans are securitized deteriorates significantly in comparison to the control group.
The highest impact is observed after three years as suggested by the coefficients for the average treatment of the treated (ATT). This seems a plausible result as we are looking at loans that already have an observable credit risk indicator (i.e., EDF). For such loans one would expect that the change in credit quality would take time as outsiders (such as CLO investors) can already assess the initial credit risk as assessed by financial markets via EDFs. In other words, the effect of banks' informational advantage over outsiders would not surface completely in the short-term and would materialize gradually over time. Table 6 presents ATTs results for ∆EDFB. We find that only ∆EDFB for year 2008 is significant. The finding captures the dramatic shift in borrowers' EDF values immediately after the start of the financial crisis in 2008. As a result of the financial crisis a significant increase was observed in credit risk in 2008 across the board for all types of borrowers. The results show that this change was larger for companies whose loans were securitized in line with our earlier findings.
Our results are also robust when two and four matches are used. We present ATTs for ∆EDFC in Table 7 . In line with the results above securitized loans performed worse in the post-crisis period, although only the difference in EDF between 2008 and the beginning of the crisis is statistically significant.
Thus far our results suggest that loans of borrowers with relatively higher default risk are less likely to be securitized, supporting the signaling hypothesis. We also show that borrowers of securitized loans performed more poorly than borrowers of non-securitized loans. There may be two ways to explain these findings. It could be that banks may be exploiting the informational advantage that they have over outsiders. That is, banks might be better able to predict more accurately future performance of the loans and keep as a result the better ones (i.e., lemons hypothesis). Alternatively, securitized loans may be performing more poorly due to banks' weaker incentives to carefully monitor borrowers (i.e., monitoring hypothesis). We test these arguments by examining the performance of borrowers whose loans are more reliant on bank monitoring.
While it is difficult to disentangle between these two hypotheses, we can provide some evidence in this direction: We hypothesize that collateralized loans, where assets are pledged against the loan by the borrower, do not require as much monitoring as uncollateralized loans. This is because the borrower, having their assets at stake, would be more vigilant about their performance.
Collateralized versus Uncollateralized Loans
We repeat our analysis and distinguish between those corporate loans requiring and not requiring collateral. Results for logit models for all three versions of ∆EDF are presented in were more likely to perform more poorly. We also observe significant negative coefficients for collateralized loans for the years 2009 and 2010. These results provides some, albeit weaker, evidence that banks kept the collateralized loans that are expected to show an inferior performance in their books rather than securitizing them. Results for ∆EDFC are shown in columns VII-XI, for collateralized, and XVI-XVIII, for uncollateralized loans. For uncollateralized loans we find significant and positive coefficients for 2009 and 2010. Overall, Table 8 provides tentative evidence suggesting that among securitized borrowers, the EDF of borrowers whose loans were not collateralized increased significantly by more compared to borrowers whose loans were collateralized.
In Table 9 we present the results for propensity score matched estimations for the two subgroups. We find that none of the coefficients for the ∆EDF ( A , B or C ) variables are significant for loans that are collateralized. For the uncollateralized sample, coefficients of ATT are statistically significant and positively related to the probability of securitization only for ∆EDF A variables. It is worthwhile to note that for ∆EDF A , ATT increases over time where the largest difference is reported Year 3. In other words the difference becomes more prevalent in the long-term as the effects of banks' reduced monitoring of the borrower gradually start influencing corporates' performance. These findings provide indirect evidence for the monitoring hypothesis. Banks, having sold the loan to third parties, might may be less interested in monitoring the borrower which in turn, may have affected the borrower's performance. This interpretation is driven by the fact that we observe more deterioration in credit quality for uncollateralized loans that are securitized.
Conclusions
We examine the relative performance of euro-denominated corporate loans securitized during the period preceding the financial crisis. We find that banks do not seem to have selected and securitized loans of lower quality to outsiders, providing evidence consistent with the signaling argument. Banks seem to have kept poorer quality corporate loans to signal the quality of the securitized assets to the investors. We also show that following securitization, the credit quality of borrowers whose loans are securitized deteriorated significantly over time compared to the control group. We find that poor performance is possibly linked to the weakening in monitoring activities by banks after securitization as within securitized loans, non-collateralized ones, show worse performance than securitized ones.
In the post-crisis period, European policy makers, recognizing the potential benefits of securitization to the financial system, are considering policy options to transform and revive securitization markets in the EU (European Central Bank, 2014). Having a better understanding of the financial stability implications of securitization can help to develop a robust securitization market. Our results suggest that securitization might impact negatively on the credit quality of securitized loans over time. They also vouch for the advantages of setting up mechanisms to improve the information quality on the collateral pledged by borrowers. These might include credit registers with enhanced information on collateral. Table 5 Change in default risk after loan issuance for securitized (treatment) versus non-securitized loans using with propensity score matching
The Table 6 Change in default risk from issuance to different periods of the financial crisis for securitized (treatment) versus non-securitized loans using propensity score matching
The Table 7 Change in default risk during the financial crisis for securitized (treatment) versus non-securitized loans using propensity score matching
The table reports the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). It shows propensity score matching estimates of the average treatment effect of securitization on the default risk, ∆EDF C , of the securitized loans. The average treatment effect of securitization on ∆EDF C is estimated as the difference between securitized loans' mean ∆EDF and that of matched non-securitized loans. ∆EDF C proxies for the deterioration or improvement of the borrower credit quality from the start of the financial crisis (Q3:2007) to three different periods of the financial crisis. The objective is to measure relative changes in default risk during the crisis. Robust standard errors are bootstrapped and presented in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Number of matched controls
One Table 8 Monitoring
incentives: Probability of loan securitization and change in default risk for collateralized and non-collateralized loans
This table presents coefficient estimates for logit regressions estimating the probability of loan securitization within one year of loan issuance. EDF is the expected default frequency, computed by Moody's KMV, at the time of the loan issuance. ∆EDFA are changes in borrower credit quality to a certain period after issuance. ∆EDF B are changes in borrower credit quality from issuance to different periods of the financial crisis. ∆EDF C are changes in borrower credit quality during the financial crisis. We control for observable loan and syndicate characteristics at the time of the loan origination. Loan characteristics include: spread (basis point over LIBOR), size, maturity, if the loan is secured, if the loan is subordinated, if the loan is sponsored, if the loan is rated, type of loan and if the loan is leveraged. Syndicated characteristics include the number of the banks in the lending syndicate and the ratio of securitization active banks within the syndicate over the total number of banks. Loan purpose is controlled for using dummy variables (categorized as general corporate use, capital structure, project finance, transport finance, corporate control and property finance). Business Industry is controlled for using dummy variables (categorized as construction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, population related services, state, manufacturing and transport). Year dummy variables control for the macroeconomic conditions. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Table 9 Monitoring incentives: Change in default risk for collateralized and non-collateralized loans after loan issuance comparing securitized (treatment) versus non-securitized loans using propensity score matching
The table reports the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). It shows propensity score matching estimates of the average treatment effect of securitization on the default risk, ∆EDF, of the securitized loans. The average treatment effect of securitization on a ∆EDF is estimated as the difference between securitized loans' mean ∆EDF and that of matched non-securitized loans. ∆EDFA are changes in borrower credit quality to a certain period after issuance. 
